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North Carolina Adopts the Uniform Condominium Act
In 1986 the North Carolina General Assembly joined a minority of state
legislatures by passing a second-generation condominium statute based on the
Uniform Condominium Act.1 Passage of the North Carolina Condominium
Act2 substantially alters the law in North Carolina regarding condominiums 3 by
providing needed statutory guidance in troublesome areas of condominium de-
velopment. 4 The Act's greatest innovation is its protection of the consumer. 5 It
also provides previously missing structure to the relationship between develop-
ers, condominium unit owners, and unit owners' associations6 and exerts sub-
stantial control over the rights and liabilities of those parties during the
development of the condominium. This Note examines the history and develop-
ment of North Carolina law dealing with condominiums. It explores the scope
and structure of the North Carolina Condominium Act, and analyzes its sub-
stantive provisions dealing with the transition from developer to association con-
trol, potential party liabilities, consumer protections, and statutory liens. 7 The
Note concludes that although the Act is incomplete and ambiguous in some
respects, its adoption is of significant benefit to all parties in the condominium
relationship.
I. BACKGROUND
Condominiums, as a form of property ownership, date back at least as far as
the Middle Ages.8 The word "condominium" is Roman in origin and signifies
co-ownership.9 Conceptually, property ownership in a condominium' 0 involves
fee title ownership of an individual unit and undivided co-ownership of the com-
1. North Carolina Condominium Act, ch. 877, 1986 N.C. Sess. Laws 129 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 47C-1-101 to -4-120 (Interim Supp. 1986)).
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 47C-1-101 to -4-120 (Interim Supp. 1986).
3. See id. §§ 47A-2 to -37 (1984).
4. "A need for a revision of the previous 'first generation' North Carolina statute was evident
because that statute did not reflect the actual day to day experience of those who have contact with
the condominium form of ownership." N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 47C N.C. comment (Interim Supp.
1986).
5. Article 4 of the North Carolina Condominium Act is devoted solely to the protection of
purchasers. Id. §§ 47C-4-101 to -120.
6. Articles 2 and 3 of the Act deal with "Creation, Alteration, and Termination of Condomin-
iums" and "Management of the Condominium," respectively. Id. §§ 47C-2-101 to -3-119.
7. Due to the length and extensive nature of the North Carolina Condominium Act, it is not
possible to deal effectively with every aspect of it in a Note; therefore, the areas chosen for discussion
are generally those identified by the General Statutes Commission as most significant. Id. ch. 47C
N.C. comment.
8. "[B]y the Middle Ages separate ownership of floors and even rooms was common in various
parts of Europe. Recorded history of such ... ownership goes back as far as the twelfth century in
the case of German cities." I P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, CONDOMINIUM LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 2.01, at 2-1 to 2-2 (1987).
9. Id. § 1.01[l], at 1-3.
10. The term "condominium" denotes a form of property ownership, not a type of property.
W. HYATT, CONDOMINIUM AND HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATION PRACTICE: COMMUNITY AssoCIA-
TION LAW 9 (1981). Nor does it indicate a use of property in North Carolina. See Graham Court
Ass'n v. Town Council, 53 N.C. App. 543, 547, 281 S.E.2d 418, 420 (1981) (holding that for pur-
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mon elements by all tenants." The fee and cotenant interests are generally indi-
visible and fully alienable. 12 Condominium ownership also brings with it most
of the other aspects of real property ownership.' 3
Condominiums first appeared in the United States in Puerto Rico in re-
sponse to desires of private individuals to own residential property where land
values were high. 14 Condominiums did not become commonplace in the United
States proper until the passage of the 1961 amendments to the National Housing
Act, 15 which authorized issuance of Federal Housing Administration (FHA)
insurance to condominium mortgages. 16 This action provided the initial impe-
tus for a dynamic and continuing growth in condominiums in this country.' 7
While the bulk of condominium growth has been in the primary residential
market,' 8 substantial development has also occurred in industrial condomini-
ums 19 as well as timeshare condominiums. 20 The reasons for the popularity of
condominiums include the desire to own property rather than lease it, high dol-
lar values on real estate, savings of landlords' profit margins, 21 individual financ-
ing, individual tax treatment, and the attractiveness of condominiums as an
investment vehicle. 22 But just as these factors have proven attractive to consum-
ers, investors, and developers, the peculiarities of the condominium relationship
have posed a number of questions which traditional property law simply is not
equipped to answer.
poses of a local zoning ordinance conversion of apartments into condominiums constituted a mere
change in ownership of the property and not a change in use).
11. W. HYATr, supra note 10, at 9. As a matter of definition, the common elements of a
condominium are "all portions... other than the units." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47C-1-103(4) (Supp.
1986). Limited common elements are "portion[s] of the common elements allocated ... for the
exclusive use of. . . fewer than all of the units." Id. § 47C-1-103(16). Unit owners pay for the
maintenance and repair of both the common and limited common elements. See infra notes 134-50
and accompanying text. These payments are commonly designated assessments.
12. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47A-5 (1984).
13. Condominium unit owners are subject to potential tort liability arising from their property
interest, face the potential that liens will be imposed against it, and enjoy the individual financing,
tax benefits, and other attributes of property ownership. See infra notes 192-223, 252-73 and accom-
panying text; see also Tar Landing Villas Owners' Ass'n v. Town of Atlantic Beach, 64 N.C. App.
239, 249, 307 S.E.2d 181, 188 (1983) (holding that for annexation purposes a condominium unit is to
be treated as a separate residential lot), disc. rev. denied, 310 N.C. 156, 311 S.E.2d 296 (1984).
14. 1 P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 8, § 2.03, at 2-8.
15. National Housing Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-70, § 234, 75 Stat. 160, 160-62 (1961) (codi-
fied at 12 U.S.C. § 1715y (1961)).
16. 1 P. ROHAN & M. REsKIN, supra note 8, § 2.03, at 2-9.
17. Condominium projects grew in number from 1,000 in 1960 to over 95,000 in 1985 and
currently house more than 15% of the United States' population. More significantly, in 1985 they
represented greater than 50% of new construction sales in urban areas. Bowler & McKenzie, 1nvist-
ble Kingdoms, CAL. LAW., Dec. 1985, at 55.
18. Note, Commercial Condominiums: Statutory Roadblocks to Development, 34 U. FLA. L.
REV. 432, 433 (1982).
19. C. GOLDSTEIN, COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL CONDOMINIUMS 5-15 (1974). Industrial
condominiums are those used for business, production, or other nonresidential purposes. Id. at 5, 6,
10-12.
20. Comment, North Carolina's Time Share Act: Guidelines For Those Who Buy and Sell Time,
20 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 931, 932-33 (1984).
21. Seeber, Condominiums in North Carolina: Improving the Statutory Base, 7 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 355, 356 (1971).
22. 1 P. ROHAN & M. REsKIN, supra note 8, § 1.01[2] & n.l.
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Condominium ownership is dominated by the interaction of three interested
parties. These parties are the unit owner, the association of unit owners that
governs the condominium, and the developer who initially creates the condo-
minium. Each of these parties has separate but overlapping interests in the con-
dominium property. Unit owners are interested in retaining the value, control,
and enjoyment of their property interests in both their individual units and the
common areas of the condominium. The owners' association, although vicari-
ously concerned with the same interests, is additionally concerned with its own
power to manage all aspects of the condominium for the benefit of the unit own-
ers as a group. The developer is interested primarily in efficiently and profitably
conveying the units of the condominium.
The overlapping and sometimes conflicting interests of these three parties
create distinct legal questions that cannot be answered fully by resort to tradi-
tional property law,23 nor, as one commentator has suggested, by analogy to
corporate law.24 The legal problems posed by condominiums range from issues
of constitutional due process 25 and procedural questions of standing26 to tradi-
tional property issues such as liens27 and warranties.28 Consequently, the neces-
sity of addressing issues created by the condominium form of ownership through
statutory regulation, as opposed to reliance on the common law of property, has
been recognized by the federal government, 29 state governments, 30 and multiple
promulgations of model codes. 31 Although the need for statutory regulation has
been widely recognized, the scope and effectiveness of the resulting legislation
has varied.32 North Carolina condominium regulation, as in most states, has
followed an evolutionary course. 33 The culmination of this course has been the
North Carolina General Assembly's adoption, with modification, of the Uni-
23. See Payne, Condominiums and the Ancient Estates in Land: New Context for Old Learning,
14 REAL EST. L.J. 291, 291 (1986); Comment, Areas of Dispute In Condominium Law, 12 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 979, 979 (1976).
24. Comment, supra note 23, at 984-89.
25. See infra notes 154-73 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 120-28 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 252-73 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 246-51 and accompanying text.
29. See National Housing Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-70, § 234, 75 Stat. 160, 160-62 (1961)
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1715y (1961)).
30. At least 49 states and the District of Columbia have statutes that sanction and control the
condominium form of ownership. I P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 8, § 2.03, at 2-9.
31. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has passed several acts
that deal with condominiums, including, the UNIF. PLANNED COMMUNITY ACT (1980), THE
MODEL REAL ESTATE TIMESHARE AcT (1982), and the UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP
ACT (1982). NORTH CAROLINA BAR FOUNDATION, NEW NORTH CAROLINA CONDOMINIUM ACT,
at 1-5 (1986). The Condominium Research Institute has promulgated a Model Condominium Code.
For a comparison of the Uniform Condominium Act and the Model Condominium Code, see
Rohan, The "Model Condominium Code"-A Blueprint For Modernizing Condominium Legislation,
78 COLUM. L. REV. 587 (1978).
32. UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT, 7 U.L.A. 421-23 (1985) (prefatory note). For a discussion of
the need for a statutory base for condominiums, see Berger, Condominium: Shelter on a Statutory
Foundation, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 987 (1963).
33. See infra notes 35-53 and accompanying text.
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form Condominium Act.34
II. THE PRIOR LAW IN NORTH CAROLINA
North Carolina's first attempt at statutory regulation of condominiums was
the enactment of the Unit Ownership Act in 1963. 35 This Act was "substan-
tially a codification of the F.H.A. Model Statute,"' 36 which was adopted for the
primary purpose of making mortgage insurance available to potential condomin-
ium owners.37 The Unit Ownership Act was permissive in nature and, as one
commentator noted, "fail[ed] to recognize and give treatment to ... many im-
portant condominium problems."' 38 This failure to recognize important condo-
minium problems 39 was for the most part a result of North Carolina's lack of
experience with the condominium form of ownership,40 and was common to
many first generation statutes. 4 1
The Unit Ownership Act was by its express provisions voluntary in nature.
It was applicable and controlling only when all of the owners submitted the
property to its provisions by executing and recording a declaration. 42 Substan-
tively, it provided a statutory scheme that established the skeletal structure for
condominium development within the State.4 3 The Act has been sharply criti-
cized for its inadequacy in addressing many problems of condominium develop-
ment, promotion, and ownership. 44 The Act, however, has not been the subject
of extensive litigation at the appellate level.4 5 Despite the lack of litigation pres-
sure it was significantly amended in 198346 and effectively repealed in 1986.47
34. North Carolina Condominium Act, ch. 877, 1986 N.C. Sess. Laws 129 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 47C-1-101 to -4-120 (Interim Supp. 1986)).
35. Unit Ownership Act, ch. 685, 1963 N.C. Sess. Laws 814 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 47A-2 to -37 (1984)).
36. Seeber, supra note 21, at 357.
37. Comment, supra note 23, at 979 n.2.
38. Seeber, supra note 21, at 357.
39. The shortcomings of the Unit Ownership Act have been noted by several commentators.
See Seeber, supra note 21, at 359-71 (discussing problems with respect to the Rule Against Perpetu-
ities, destruction of the condominium, control of the condominium, withdrawal of the condominium
from the scope of the Unit Ownership Act, unit owner liability, insuring the condominium, and
taxation); Comment, supra note 23, at 979 (discussing continuing problems of condominium owner-
ship in the face of the Unit Ownership Act as including promoter abuse, specific performance, lien
priorities, U.C.C. applicability, warranties, and common area ownership).
40. Seeber, supra note 21, at 358.
41. UNIF. CONDOMINIuM AcT, supra note 32, at 421-22 (prefatory note).
42. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47A-4 (1984).
43. The Act defined the essential attributes of the condominium, id. §§ 47A-3, -5; delineated
the basic relations between owner associations, developers, and unit owners, id. §§ 47A-6 to -12; and
superficially addressed such topics as liens, unit taxation, liabilities, and insurance, id. §§ 47A-21 to
-24.
44. See supra note 39.
45. One explanation offered is that the Act was insufficiently specific to allow for litigation.
Comment, supra note 23, at 980 n.4.
46. Act of June 27, 1983, ch. 624, 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws 556 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 47A-33 to -36 (1984)).
47. The Act remains in effect as to condominiums originally brought within its scope for most
actions occurring prior to October 1, 1986. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47C-1-102 (Supp. 1986).
[Vol. 66
UNIFORM CONDOMINIUM ACT
The only major amendment to the Unit Ownership Act occurred in 1983,48
when the general assembly enacted a second article49 that dealt specifically with
lessees in conversion condominiums.50 For various reasons, owners of existing
apartments in the early 1980's were converting them into condominiums and
Article 2 of the Unit Ownership Act was enacted in response. The general as-
sembly recognized the potential for abuse by apartment owners and condomin-
ium developers whenever lessees were forced to buy or vacate as a result of a
condominium conversion.5 1 This concern was greatest when the lessees faced
with such a choice were the aged or disabled.5 2 Article 2 of the Unit Ownership
Act remains in effect and is incorporated by reference into the North Carolina
Condominium Act.
5 3
The specific provisions of the Unit Ownership Act will not be set forth here.
Instead, they will be contrasted with the superceding provisions of the North
Carolina Condominium Act.
III. THE NORTH CAROLINA CONDOMINIUM AcT
By 1985, a number of commentators had criticized the Unit Ownership Act
as being inadequate to deal with the plethora of problems associated with the
condominium relationship. To cure these deficiencies the general assembly
turned to the Uniform Condominium Act. The Uniform Condominium Act
was first promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws in 1977 in response to the inadequate and inconsistent provi-
sions of various first generation state laws regulating condominiums.5 4 The
Conference of Commissioners subsequently amended the Act in 1980. 55 The
Uniform Act is organized into five articles, the first four of which form the basis
for the North Carolina Condominium Act.5 6 These four articles are: (1) gen-
eral provisions; (2) creation, alteration, and termination of condominiums;
(3) management of condominiums; and (4) protection of condominium purchas-
48. The Unit Ownership Act underwent several minor amendments. In 1969 and 1971 it was
amended to expand the definitions of "condominium unit" and "building." Act of June 16, 1969, ch.
848, §§ 1-2, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 946, 946-47 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47A-3(12), (15)
(1984)); Act of May 21, 1971, ch. 418, § 1, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 345, 345 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 47A-3(la) (1984)). In 1973 the requirement to attach bylaws to the deed of the first unit
was eliminated. Act of May 23, 1973, ch. 734, § 1, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 1092, 1092 (codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47A-18 (1984)). In 1981 the provisions governing conveyance of a condomin-
ium were simplified. Act of June 8, 1981, ch. 527, §2, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 799, 799 (codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47A-14.1 (1984)); Act of June 16, 1981, ch. 587, § 1, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 858,
858 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47A-15 (1984)).
49. Act of June 27, 1983, ch. 624, § 1, 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws 556, 556-57 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 47A-33 to -36 (1984)).
50. A conversion condominium is a preexisting building that "at any time before the creation of
the condominium was occupied wholly or partially by persons other than the purchasers and persons
who occupy with the consent of the purchasers." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47A-34(l) (1984).
51. Note, Statutory Protection Against Condominium Conversions for North Carolina Residen-
tial Tenants, 62 N.C.L. REV. 1346, 1347-48 (1984).
52. Id. at 1350-51.
53. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47C-4-106 (Interim Supp. 1986).
54. UNIF. CONDOMINIUM AcT, supra note 32, at 421-22 (historical note).
55. UNIF. CONDOMINIUM AcT, supra note 32, at 421 (historical note).
56. NORTH CAROLINA BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 31, at I-5.
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ers. 57 The fifth article, which is not incorporated into the North Carolina Act,
creates a state administrative agency to regulate condominiums. 58 By February
1986, the Uniform Condominium Act had been adopted by nine states.59 North
Carolina adopted Articles 1 through 4 of the Uniform Act. Apart from the
deletion of Article 5, the North Carolina Act made a number of changes to
Articles 1 through 4. Some of these changes were merely procedural, but several
were substantive and these will be noted throughout the discussion of the North
Carolina Condominium Act.
A. The Statutory Scope
The first significant change in North Carolina condominium law wrought
by the Act relates to the scope and nature of its application. In contrast to the
Unit Ownership Act, the North Carolina Condominium Act provides for a
mandatory and highly controlled application of its provisions upon a determina-
tion that a development is a condominium. As of October 1, 1986,60 a condo-
minium in North Carolina is defined as "real estate, portions of which are
designated for separate ownership and the remainder of which is designated for
common ownership solely by the owners of those portions." 6 t No real estate is a
condominium "unless the undivided interests in the common elements 62 are
vested in the unit owners." 63 The Unit Ownership Act definition was much
broader, providing only that a condominium is "the ownership of single units in
a multi-unit structure with common areas and facilities."' 64 This definition
permited inclusion of associated forms of ownership 65 not permitted under the
North Carolina Condominium Act. Arguably this narrowing is some evidence
of the regulatory intent underlying the Condominium Act in comparison to the
permissive intent behind the Unit Ownership Act.
A second important aspect of the scope of the Condominium Act is its
mandatory application. The Act expressly states that it "applies to all condo-
miniums created within this State after October 1, 1986,"66 and precludes avoid-
57. UNIF. CONDOMINIUM AcT, supra note 32, at 425-26 (table of contents).
58. UNIF. CONDOMINIUM AcT, supra note 32, §§ 5-101 to -110, at 567-78.
59. UNIF. CONDOMINIUM Acr, supra note 32, at 45 (Cum. Supp. 1986) (table ofjurisdictions),
60. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47C-1-102(a) (Supp. 1986). The Act's primary application is
prospective.
61. Id. § 47C-1-103(7).
62. Common elements are defined by the Act as "all portions of a condominium other than the
units." Id. § 47C-1-103(4).
63. Id. § 47C-1-103(7).
64. Id. § 47A-3(5) (1984).
65. Other forms would include incorporated associations whose "interests" in the units and
common areas were not vested property interests but instead share interests. The drafters of the
North Carolina Condominium Act, the General Statutes Commission, initially attempted to main-
tain this broad coverage in the modification of the Uniform Act, but later abandoned this notion in
favor of a more restrictive definition of condominium in accordance with the Uniform Act. NORTH
CAROLINA BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 31, at 1-6.
66. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47C-I-102(a) (Supp. 1986). Designated provisions of the Act apply to
condominiums already in existence as of October 1, 1986, but only with respect to "events and
circumstances occurring" thereafter. Id.
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ance of its terms by contract, waiver, or other device.6 7 In comparison, the Unit
Ownership Act was voluntary in nature. Property potentially subject to the
Unit Ownership Act only became subject to it when the owners of the condo-
minium project filed a declaration. 68 Application of the Unit Ownership Act,
therefore, could be avoided at the whim of the developer. This change in ap-
proach to the regulation of condominiums evinces a clear legislative intent to
exert control over the parties and actions in the condominium relationship.
69
B. The Statutory Structure
If an existing or planned development falls within the statutory definition,
the developer is required to take certain administrative steps to validate the de-
velopment as a condominium. The primary condition precedent to legal exist-
ence as a condominium is the filing of a declaration 0. 7  This declaration must be
filed, as a deed would be, in all counties wherein any of the condominium prop-
erty lies.7 1 The declaration is filed by the declarant, 72 who is typically the
developer of the condominium project. The declaration must include: descrip-
tions as to name,73 location,74 and specifications of individual units;75 size of the
condominium project;76 apportionment of common elements, 77 voting power of
association members,78 and common expense liabilities; 79 restrictions on use or
alienability;80 and full disclosure of any reserved rights as to future development
of the condominium project.8 ' The declaration requirements perform two func-
tions. They require definitive provisions on aspects of condominium ownership
which if undefined could be troublesome, and they provide some notice to poten-
tial buyers. Thus, the declaration is not only the legitimizing legal document of
the condominium project, but is also an important means of disseminating con-
67. Id. § 47C-1-104(a). The Act does permit a written waiver of rights after violation of the
statute. Id. § 47C-1-104(b). The use of other devices includes use of proxies or powers of attorney.
Id. § 47C-1-104(d).
68. Id. § 47A-4 (1984).
69. The Act does not presume, however, to be all-encompassing and provides that "[t]he prin-
ciples of law and equity supplement the provisions of this chapter except to the extent inconsistent
with this chapter." Id. § 47C-1-108 (Supp. 1986).
70. The Act defines "declaration" as "any instruments, however denominated, which create a
condominium, and any amendments to those instruments." Id. § 47C-1-103(10).
71. Id. § 47C-2-I01(a). This section makes the filing of a declaration a mandatory act that
creates the condominium. This section further requires substantial completion of the condominium
by evidence of the recording of a certificate of completion certified by a licensed architect or regis-
tered engineer. Id. § 47C-2-101(b). The Act also requires the filing of the condominium's plat or
plan, which is considered part of the declaration but is required to be filed separately. Id. § 47C-2-
109. For a discussion of possible conflicts between local platting ordinances and state condominium
statutes, see Tudzarov, Platting the Condominium: Is it Required?, 15 REAL EST. L.J. 22 (1986).
72. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47C-1-103(a) (Supp. 1986).
73. Id. § 47C-2-105(l).
74. Id. §§ 47C-2-105(2), (3).
75. Id. §§ 47C-2-105(5) to (7).
76. Id. § 47C-2-105(4).
77. Id. § 47C-2-105(l 1).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. § 47C-2-105(12).
81. Id. §§ 47C-2-105(8), (9).
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sumer information.8 2
In comparison, the Unit Ownership Act's requirements for filing a declara-
tion8 3 were similar in form,8 4 but substantially less specific in content.8 5 Under
the Unit Ownership Act the declaration was required to contain a general de-
scription of the apportioned interests,8 6 restrictions on use, 87 and "any further
details ... which the person executing the declaration may deem desirable.
88
This approach reflects the essentially skeletal nature of the Unit Ownership Act.
The Condominium Act also provides guidance as to the priority, interpretation,
and continuing viability of a declaration.89 The Act expressly declares all provi-
sions of the declaration severable, 90 and controlling when they conflict with the
bylaws of the owners' association. 91 As previously noted, the declaration is re-
quired to define certain fundamental aspects of the unit owners' rights and re-
sponsibilities in relation to those of the owners' association and the developer.
As such, the power to control the contents of the declaration is critical to the
stability and fairness of the tripartite relationship it creates.
To this end the Condominium Act provides for amendment to the declara-
tion,92 with exceptions, 93 on a sixty-seven percent affirmative vote of the unit
owners' association.94 Conversely, the Unit Ownership Act permitted amend-
ment to the declaration as provided for therein. 95 Because the declaration is
virtually always drafted by the developer, the potential for abuse of the amend-
ment procedure contained in the Unit Ownership Act is obvious. The
supermajority voting requirement in the North Carolina Condominium Act,
combined with the statutorily mandated provisions of the declaration, ensure the
82. For a detailed description and discussion of these purchasers' rights, see itfra notes 224-51
and accompanying text.
83. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47A-13 (1984).
84. The Unit Ownership Act, like the Condominium Act, required the filing of the declaration
in the county register of deeds' office, and required inclusion of general information describing the
condominium and the allocation of its elements. Id.
85. The Unit Ownership Act did not require any revelation of future development rights, com-
mon expense liabilities, unit owner voting rights, or any of the other information required by the
Condominium Act. Id.
86. Id. § 47A-13(1) to (5).
87. Id. § 47A-13(6).
88. Id. § 47A-13(8).
89. Id. § 47C-2-103 (Supp. 1986).
90. Severability avoids the wholesale invalidation of declarations when one provision is deter-
mined invalid. Id.
91. Id. § 47C-2-t03(c).
92. Id. § 47C-2-117.
93. The exceptions to the power to amend by 67% vote of the unit owners' association are
those instances in which the declarant, the association, or the unit owner may execute an amend-
ment as provided for in the Act. Id. § 47C-2-117(a). These include instances in which development
rights are exercised, common element or unit interests are reallocated, and the condominium is
terminated. Id. Additionally, unless permitted or required by other sections of the Act, unanimous
consent of the unit owners is required to amend the declaration so as to "increase special declarant
rights, increase the number of units, or change the boundaries of any unit, the allocated interest of a
unit, or the uses to which any unit is restricted." Id. § 47C-2-117(d).
94. Id. § 47C-2-117(a). The unit owners' association may raise the majority vote required to
amend the declaration, but may lower it only if all units are exclusively nonresidential. Id.
95. Id. § 47A-13(9) (1984).
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stability of the primary document in the condominium relationship, 96 while pro-
tecting against developer overreaching.
C. Unit Owners' Association
The allocation of interests in the condominium relationship and the
mandatory nature of the North Carolina Condominium Act are both important
aspects of its structure. The most notable structural provisions of the Act, how-
ever, relate to the organization and powers of the unit owners' association. As
previously discussed, many of the complexities of law resulting from condomin-
ium ownership result from the tripartite relationship between the developer, the
unit owner, and the unit owners' association. The Condominium Act delineates
the form of the unit owners' association and gives it impressive statutory powers
to conduct its business.
Section 3-101 of the Condominium Act requires establishment of a unit
owners' association "no later than the date the first unit in the condominium is
conveyed."' 97 The section permits the association to be "organized as a profit or
non-profit corporation or as an unincorporated association"9 8 and limits mem-
bership to all unit owners. 99 The Act requires the unit owners' association to
form an executive board that can act with the full authority of the association,
unless restricted by declaration, bylaw, or statute. 1° ° Board members are ex-
pressly designated as fiduciaries of the association, and their conduct with re-
spect to the association is controlled by requirements of "good faith, and...
diligence and care which ordinarily prudent men would exercise.. "10 These
provisions suggest that the general assembly envisioned the executive board ac-
complishing functional day-to-day management of the condominium, with only
annual supervision from the entire association.
Section 3-102 of the Act delineates the-powers of the association once it is
formed. t0 2 These include the power to govern itself,10 3 manage the condomin-
ium,104 make contracts, 10 5 bring suit,10 6 acquire property, 107 and impose fines
96. The continuing viability of the declaration is ensured by the Act's express exclusion of the
Rule Against Perpetuities. Id. § 47C-2-103(b). Black's Law Dictionary defines the Rule Against
Perpetuities as the "[p]rinciple that no interest in property is good unless it must vest, if at all, not
later than 21 years, plus period of gestation, after some life or lives in being at time of creation of the
interest." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1195 (5th ed. 1979). The Rule Against Perpetuities poses
potential problems to certain property allocations in the declaration, such as rights of first refusal
and allocations of interest on the destruction of the condominium. See Natelson, Avoiding Perpetu-
ities Problems in Condo Declarations, 13 COLO. LAW. 2229, 2229-31 (1984); Rohan, Drafting Condo-
minium Instruments: Provisions for Destruction, Obsolescence and Eminent Domain, 65 COLUM. L.
REV. 593 (1965); Seeber, supra note 21, at 359-64.
97. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47C-3-101 (Supp. 1986).
98. Id.
99. Id. If the condominium is terminated, membership in the association may include all per-
sons entitled to the proceeds from the termination. Id.
100. Id. § 47C-3-I03(a).
101. Id. This standard of fiduciary care is identical to that set out in the North Carolina Busi-
ness Corporation Act. Id. § 55-35 (1982).
102. Id. § 47C-3-102 (Supp. 1986).
103. Id.
104. Id. §§ 47C-3-102(1) to (3), (6) to (7).
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on association members.10 8 These powers are supplemented by the general
power to "[e]xercise any other powers necessary and proper for the governance
and operation of the association."' 10 9 This grant of statutory authority is impres-
sive, particularly because it allows an unincorporated association to perform a
number of functions heretofore reserved to legal entities.
The association's power to govern itself is primarily constrained by the dec-
laration and bylaws." 0 The statute provides that the declaration and bylaws
shall govern the association, I I I with the declaration being the primary governing
document. 12 Subordinated to the declaration are the bylaws of the unit owners'
association, which control its form and function. 1 3 The Condominium Act
does not circumscribe the substantive content of the bylaws, but does require
certain notice-serving provisions to be included.1 4 The Act also authorizes the
association to enforce violations of the declaration, bylaws, or rules and regula-
tions of the association by fines." 15
In addition to the ability to govern itself, the unit owners' association is also
empowered to manage the condominium.1 6 This is its primary function, and its
primary goal in carrying out this function is the preservation of the economic
value of the condominium. The Act specifically charges the association with
responsibility "for causing the common elements to be maintained, repaired, and
replaced when necessary .. . . ,117 This responsibility extends to ensuring that
damage caused to common areas by unit owners is repaired." 8 Conversely, the
association may not manage with impunity because it is vicariously liable for
damages caused to any unit of the condominium by agents of the association. 119
The Act also gives the unit owners' association authority to bring suit in its
own name.120 This authorization is not a significant change from the authority
granted in the Unit Ownership Act, which permitted the association to bring
suit, but required it to be brought by the manager, board of directors, or an
aggrieved owner.' 2 1 Although this seems a minor distinction, less than three
105. Id. § 47C-3-102(5).
106. Id. § 47C-3-102(4).
107. Id. § 47C-3-102(8).
108. Id. § 47C-3-102(a)(1 1).
109. Id. § 47C-3-102(a)(16).
110. Id. § 47C-3-102.
111. Id. § 47C-3-102(a).
112. Id.
113. Id.; see id. § 47C-3-106.
114. Id. § 47C-3-106. These provisions include mandatory descriptions of the size, duties, pow-
ers, and procedures for election of board members, as well as descriptions of how and by whom the
executive board powers may be exercised. Id. § 47C-3-106(3) to (5).
115. Id. § 47C-3-107A.
116. See id. § 47C-3-102(a).
117. Id. § 47C-3-107(a).
118. Id. § 47C-3-107(b).
119. Id. § 47C-3-107(c).
120. Id. § 47C-3-102(a)(4). This provision is different from the Uniform Condominium Act re-
quirement that the association must sue on behalf of "2 or more unit owners." Id. § 47C-3-102 N.C.
comment; UNIF. CONDOMINIUM AcT, supra note 32, § 3-102(a)(4), at 502.
121. Id. § 47A-10 (1984).
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months before the Condominium Act became effective, the North Carolina
Court of Appeals denied an association standing to bring suit in its own name
based on this distinction.
In Laurel Park Villas Homeowners Association v. Hodges'22 a unit owners'
association sought to enjoin a unit owner's actions that violated rules promul-
gated by the association. 12 3 These violations included parking in unauthorized
areas, playing a stereo too loudly, and having a child in the member's unit. 124
On these facts the court of appeals extended its prior strict construction rule for
determining property associations' standing to sue to the provisions of the Unit
Ownership Act. 125 In Hodges the court of appeals held that section 47A-10 of
the Unit Ownership Act was to be construed strictly; therefore, such an action
could only be maintained by the manager or board of directors, neither of
whom had instigated the action in the case. 126
The Condominium Act would appear to favor a different result on the facts
in Hodges. Section 3-102 of the Act expressly provides that "the association,
even if unincorporated, may ... [i]nstitute, defend, or intervene in its own name
in litigation or administrative proceedings on matters affecting the condomin-
ium."1 27 The requirement that the action be maintained by the manager or
board of directors has been eliminated; the logical inference is that the general
assembly intended to remove this requirement and thereby broadened the ability
of the association to bring suit.
It is not entirely clear, however, that section 3-102 would necessarily re-
quire such a result. A court could find that, as a practical matter, no one but the
directors of the association can logically institute suit for the association. The
Hodges court did not appear to question that the association, not the individual
unit owners, was suing. Nonetheless, it is difficult to envision how the associa-
tion was bringing suit when its directors were not involved. Hodges is arguably
no longer good law in North Carolina.1 28
122. 82 N.C. App. 141, 345 S.E.2d 464 (1986).
123. Id. at 142, 345 S.E.2d at 465.
124. Id.
125. This prior strict construction rule was set forth in Beech Mountain Property Owners' Ass'n
v. Current, 35 N.C. App. 135, 240 S.E.2d 503 (1978). In Current an incorporated property owners'
association was denied standing to sue when it attempted to enforce restrictive covenants contained
in deeds to a resort development so as to collect unpaid assessments. Id. at 135, 240 S.E.2d at 504.
This case was governed by the common law of real property. Existing restrictive covenants granted
enforcement rights to "the owners of lots in the neighborhood or subdivision, or any of them jointly
or severally." Id. at 138, 240 S.E.2d at 506. The court determined that the grantor did not intend to
convey standing to enforce the restrictive covenants on the property owners' association. Id. at 139,
240 S.E.2d at 507. The court of appeals concluded that because restrictive covenants were to be
strictly construed as " 'in derogation of the free and unfettered use of land,' "so also was standing to
enforce them. Id. at 138, 240 S.E.2d at 506 (quoting Reed v. Elmore, 246 N.C. 221, 224, 98 S.E.2d
360, 363 (1957)).
126. Hodges, 82 N.C. App. at 144, 345 S.E.2d at 466.
127. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47C-3-102(a)(4) (Supp. 1986).
128. This is so for two reasons. The first is that the Condominium Act provision is facially
broader than the corresponding Unit Ownership Act section. The second is that in the absence of a
specific provision on who may maintain an action under the Condominium Act, precedent favors a
liberal determination of standing. In Piney Mountain Neighborhood Ass'n v. Town of Chapel Hill,
63 N.C. App. 244, 304 S.E.2d 251 (1983), the court of appeals granted an incorporated property
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Another manifestation of the association's statutory authority is its ability
to convey or encumber the condominiums' common elements,129 although such
action requires approval of eighty percent of the unit owners' association.
130
Any contract of conveyance or encumbrance of common areas requires recorda-
tion, execution, and ratification as if it were a deed.13' The Act authorizes the
association to contract for the sale or encumbrance of common areas, but such a
contract is not enforceable until ratified by the association members.' 32
Finally, the Act makes void any purported conveyance, encumbrance, or
judicial sale of the common elements, unless such transactions conform with the
eighty percent ratification requirement. 133 Conceptually, this power to convey
common elements is troubling. Common elements are owned by all unit owners
as tenants in common. Conveyance thereof over the dissenting vote of any co-
tenant is contrary to traditional concepts of fee ownership. Although the basis
for such a conveyance could be contractual if included in the declaration, the
Act does not require this. The power to convey on less than the unanimous
consent of cotenants abrogates common law rights of property ownership, and
because of its statutory basis, implicates due process rights of dissenting coten-
ants. Although contracts controlling alienation of real property exist and are
enforced, they typically take the form of restraints on alienation. A cotenant's
normal remedy in dissent of a sale of jointly owned property is partition. This
remedy evidently is not available under the Act. The obvious purpose of the
alienation provision is to permit the association some flexibility with respect to
future contingencies. Given the supermajority voting requirement, this seems a
reasonable provision. Nevertheless, unit owners may choose a condominium
specifically because it has substantial common areas, and given the absence of
notice requirements for this provision, it is likely that the unit owner so situated
would be both surprised and disadvantaged by a sale of the common elements
over his dissenting vote.
The powers of the unit owners' association over its membership are also
extensive. Its primary function with respect to its membership is to allocate the
general and specific expenses of the condominium. The primacy of this function,
from the perspective of the unit owners, does not require elaboration. The Act
owners' association standing to sue, even though it had no property interest, because the association
represented property owners who did have an interest. Id. at 247, 304 S.E.2d at 253. In Piney Mt.
the association sought to contest a public housing development being considered for property adja-
cent to the neighborhood represented by the association. Id. The court of appeals noted this was a
case of first impression and cited a "trend in other jurisdictions toward relaxing strict procedural
requirements involving standing." Id. The court seems to have implicitly distinguished between
bald association assertions of standing (viewed liberally), association assertions of standing based on
statute as in Hodges (viewed strictly), and assertions of standing based on assignment as in Current
(viewed strictly).
129. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47C-3-112(a) (Supp. 1986).
130. Id.
131. Id. §47C-3-112(b).
132. Id. § 47C-3-112(c).
133. Id. § 47C-3-1 12(d). This provision protects the common elements from loss due to liabili-




provides the framework for the exercise of this assessment power, but does not
substantially limit it.
The general power to assess relates to the association's ability to distribute
the costs of recurring common expenses. 134 Common expenses are "expendi-
tures made by or financial liabilities of the association, together with any alloca-
tions to reserves." 135 The general assessment power allows the association to
assess monies from unit owners to pay for regular costs associated with the
maintenance of the condominium. The Condominium Act permits allocation of
the common expenses to individual units in accordance with the declaration. 136
The Act, however, does not control the apportionment of such allocation, except
to implicitly require some contribution by each unit 137 and to explicitly require
inclusion of the apportionment formula in the declaration. 13 8 Thus, although
the Act generally does not require equality of apportionment among the unit
owners, 139 it does require consistency of apportionment with concurrent notice
to any potential buyer. 14° The Act contains three important exceptions to the
requirement of an assessment by declaration formula. The first exception occurs
when common expenses are associated with limited common elements,14 1 com-
mon expenses benefit less than all units, 142 or insurance costs and costs of utili-
ties are allocated. 14 3 The second exception limits common expense liability
resulting from a judgment against the association.144 The last exception is trig-
gered when common expenses result from a specific owner's misconduct. 145
The more specific power to assess follows from the association's duty to
repair the condominium. 146 In fulfilling this duty the association may "assess
the unit owners as necessary to recover the costs of ... maintenance, repair, or
replacement" of common elements. 147 Further, should the association repair
damage to common areas caused by a unit owner, it may assess the owner the
cost of such repair up to five hundred dollars. 148 This assessment, if unpaid,
may result in the creation of a statutory lien on the unit owners' property inter-
est in the condominium. 14 9 Such action may be taken after a voluntary hearing
134. "[A]II common expenses must be assessed against all the units in accordance with the allo-
cations set forth in the declaration ...." Id. § 47C-3-115(b).
135. Id. § 47C-1-103(5).
136. Id. § 47C-3-115(b).
137. Under §§ 47C-2-107 and 47C-3-115, the Act implicitly requires some contribution by all
units.
138. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47C-2-107A (Supp. 1986).
139. The act does require equality or nondiscrimination with respect to the declarant vice
nondeclarant-owned units. Id.
140. Id. The Act also requires proportional repayment of excess funds, unless the declaration
provides otherwise. Id. § 47C-3-114.
141. Id. § 47C-3-115(c)(1).
142. Id. § 47C-3-115(c)(2).
143. Id. § 47C-3-115(c)(3).
144. Id. § 47C-3-115(d).
145. Id. § 47C-3-115(e).
146. Id. § 47C-3-107.
147. Id. § 47C-3-107(a).
148. Id. § 47C-3-107(d).
149. Id.
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summarily described by the Act. 150
This last statutory provision is more notable for what it fails to say than for
what it does say. Specifically, what is the nature of the hearing required by the
Act? Should the association choose not to incorporate the hearing into its as-
sessment procedure, it is also unclear what limitations on the association's as-
sessment power exist. The implicit limitation seems to be the presumption of
court supervision of an action to enforce the assessment. This raises a question
as to what rights of appeal, if any, follow the hearing procedure outlined in the
statute.151 If the answer is the same as that for the association's general assess-
ment power-resort to state courts-then the rationale for prescribing such a
procedure is questionable. That is, if the hearing is only a pro forma proceeding
with no precedential value in any action enforcing or challenging it, then unit
owner compliance with its result is at most voluntary. 152 Last, the enforcement
of any such assessment implicates constitutional due process concerns.
153
D. Quasi-Governmental Status of the Unit Owners' Association
Perhaps the most striking facet of the Condominium Act's empowerment of
the unit owners' association is the association's resulting quasi-governmental sta-
tus. Under the Condominium Act the association is an entity that, through both
the power of the state and the consent of its members, may exercise broad and
extensive authority over unit owners.' 54 Yet this power is not subject to the
constitutional safeguards restricting the actions of local, state, and federal gov-
ernments.155 Actions by owners' associations may implicate a number of consti-
tutional rights stemming primarily from fundamental constitutional guarantees
made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment.' 56 Potential claims
arising from the quasi-governmental nature of the association include denial of
equal protection when variations in enforcement of bylaws or regulations occur,
or when alteration of the one person-one vote model in association elections is
150. Id.
151. "No detail is given concerning the composition or structure of such an adjudicatory panel,
other than the statement that notice of the charge and the final decision, and an opportunity to be
heard and present evidence must be given to the party sought to be charged." NORTH CAROLINA
BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 31, at IV-9.
152. The critical aspect in such a case is whether a court asked to enforce such an assessment
would review the merits of the assessment or simply look at the procedure used to arrive at tle
assessment. The former approach reduces the significance of the statutory hearing procedure. The
latter could raise serious constitutional questions of due process and equal protection. See infra
notes 154-74 and accompanying text.
153. Note, Judicial Review of Condominium Rulemaking, 94 HARV. L. REv. 647, 658 (1981).
154. The Condominium Act expressly grants the owners' association the power to assess, fine,
and create rules and regulations governing the condominium. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 47C-3-102,
-107A, -115 (Supp. 1986). Concurrently, the Act requires express notice of the existing governmen-
tal structure of the association to be provided to any prospective purchaser. Id. §§ 47C-2-101, -2-
105, 4-103. Despite the originally consensual nature of the relationship, this characterization be-
comes strained with respect to future action by the association: it seems meaningless to say the unit
owner consented in advance to unknown actions of the association.
155. Note, supra note 153, at 647. The unit owners' association is largely considered to be an
essentially private entity. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519,
1522 (1982).
156. Shifrin, Community Associations and the Power to Levy Fines, 71 ILL. B.J. 604, 605 (1983).
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encountered;' 57 and due process claims of both a substantive 5 8 and proce-
dural 159 nature, when the association restricts certain types of behavior or fines
its members for violations of the rules governing the condominium.
160
Several commentators have noted the quasi-governmental nature of the
condominium 16 1 and have posited that associations are at the same time similar
to and different from a small municipal government.' 62 The similarity stems
from an association's performance of governmental-type functions. 16 3 A pri-
mary distinction is that submission to the authority of a unit owners' association
is fundamentally consensual in nature. 164 This dual character of the owners'
association and the potential problems it poses reflect two competing state inter-
ests. The first is a desire to grant the owners' association the power to manage
the condominium adequately and efficiently.' 65 Effective administration en-
hances the viability of the condominium as a popular form of ownership, poten-
tially relieves the state of some duties with respect to the condominium, and
with luck reduces the judicial costs of condominium litigation. The second state
interest is protection of the constitutional rights of the associations' members, 1
66
particularly when a violation occurs through association acts apparently author-
ized by the government. 167 If such violations may be attributed to state action,
the state may be liable for them.
168
This dichotomy in the nature of the unit owners' association and the poten-
157. For a discussion of unit owners' constitutional rights with respect to owners' associations,
see Weakland, Condominium Associations: Living Under the Due Process Shadow, 13 PEPPERDINE
L. REV. 297, 310-20 (1986); see also Ellickson, supra note 155, at 1541-44 (comparing municipal
voting rights to unit owner association voting rights).
158. See Weakland, supra note 157, at 310-13 (reviewing cases in which the court dealt with
substantive due process claims brought by unit owners against owner associations).
159. See Weakland, supra note 157, at 314-16 (reviewing cases in which the court dealt with
procedural due process claims brought by owner associations as individual owners).
160. The act of fining an association member, currently permitted by § 47C-3-107 of the North
Carolina Condominium Act, presents a classic procedural due process problem. This situation re-
quires notice of the charge, an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence, and notice of the
decision, but the form and nature of the hearing are unclear. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47C-3-107
(Supp. 1986). It is further unclear whether the proceeding under § 47C-3-107 would constitute state
action. If it does not, then the fourteenth amendment is not implicated. Weakland, supra note 157,
at 320. If it does, then the question before the court will be whether the hearing satisfied due
process.
161. "Each unit owner is subject to the dictates of local statutory and common law and is also
bound by a more private law--one personally ratified and accepted upon consummation of the con-
dominium purchase." Note, Individual Property Rights Versus Majority Rule in the Condominium
Community, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 483, 492 (1981).
162. Ellickson, supra note 155, at 1520-26.
163. These functions include both regulation and taxation. Ellickson, supra note 155, at 1522.
164. Note, The Rule of Law in Residential Associations, 99 HARV. L. REV. 472, 478-81 (1985).
165. Note, supra note 153, at 652-53.
166. Note, supra note 153, at 653-55. Evidently the General Statutes Commission was aware of
the potential for constitutional due process claims and commented that the adjudicatory hearing
described in § 47C-3-107(d) "provides for minimal due process for the party charged." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 47C-3-107 N.C. comment (Supp. 1986).
167. Deprivation of constitutional rights by an association may incur liability for the state if such
action is prescribed by statute, directed by an administrative agency, or enforced in the courts.
Weakland, supra note 157, at 320.
168. Weakland, supra note 157, at 320.
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tial constitutional problems it causes have been recognized by the courts, 169 but
remains unresolved. The courts that have considered litigation involving own-
ers' associations have fashioned a variety of approaches depending on the nature
of the action. 170 Some courts have analogized to municipal law in cases in
which an association has acted in a governmental capacity.17 1 Similarly, associ-
ation restrictions have been subjected to constitutional analysis. 172 Other courts
have analyzed owner claims against the association on a consent theory. 173
Last, some courts have applied a standard of equitable reasonableness to associa-
tion actions that restrict the rights of owners. 174 One thing is clear: this area of
condominium law is far from settled. Although the issues are currently unliti-
gated in North Carolina, they are unlikely to remain so.
IV. THE NORTH CAROLINA CONDOMINIUM ACT'S SUBSTANTIVE
PROVISIONS: EXPLANATION AND ANALYSIS
The North Carolina Condominium Act provides separate substantive regu-
lation of three topics of concern in the condominium relationship: (1) the period
of transition from developer control to owner control; (2) consumer protections;
and (3) liens on condominium property. Although these three issues are not the
only ones affected by the Act's provisions, most of the important provisions ad-
dress these areas.
A. Transition Period
An express concern of the North Carolina General Statutes Commission in
drafting the North Carolina Condominium Act was the inadequacy of the Unit
Ownership Act in regulating "the important period of transition between the
developer control and control by the owners association."1 75 The Condomin-
ium Act provides for transfer of control in several ways. The Act allows control
of the unit owners' association to shift from the developer to the unit owners, 176
permits the unit owners' association to terminate contracts made by the devel-
oper, 177 requires insurance to be maintained at a specified time in the transition
period, 17 8 and requires the developer to pay all common expenses until the own-
ers' association can make an assessment. 179 These provisions ensure smooth
transition of functional control, continuous protection of unit owners' interests,
and uninterrupted provision of essential services. Concurrently, the provisions
169. See Weakland, supra note 157, at 300-01.
170. Weakland, supra note 157, at 300-26.
171. Weakland, supra note 157, at 307-10.
172. See Weakland, supra note 157, at 310-20.
173. Weakland, supra note 157, at 300-03.
174. Note, supra note 153, at 658-63.
175. N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 47C N.C. comment (Interim Supp. 1986).
176. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47C-3-103 (Interim Supp. 1986).
177. Id. § 47C-3-105.
178. Id. § 47C-3-113.
179. Id. § 47C-3-115(a).
[Vol. 66
UNIFORM CONDOMINIUM ACT
allow the owners' association to operate independently of developer-made con-
tracts in certain circumstances.
The declaration may include provisions allowing initial developer control of
the unit owners' association. 180 This control is probably desirable, because de-
velopers' interests and experience make them a likely choice to manage the con-
dominium in its early stages. This period of developer control is strictly
circumscribed by the Act and must end no later than two years after the last
offering of a unit for sale by the developer.18 1 During this period the developer
must afford gradually increasing representation on the executive board of the
association to unit owners.1 82 After the period of authorized developer control
has expired, the association may operate independently.
The Act also permits the independent association to terminate contracts
entered into by the association when it was under developer control. 18 3 Termi-
nation of contracts may occur without regard to the substantive fairness of the
contracts if they involve management of the condominium, employment, or
leases of parking or recreational areas. 184 The association may also terminate a
contract in that the developer was an interested party or a contract that was
unconscionable to the unit owners when made.185 This provision of the Act is a
substantial protection of unit owners from potential self-dealing by unscrupu-
lous developers; it is also a substantial abrogation of normal contract rights. In
recognition of the potential burden it might pose on third parties acting in good
faith, the Act requires express notice of this right of termination to appear on the
face of contracts entered into by the developer.186
Another substantive control on the transition period is the Act's provisions
on insurance. Insurance is required from the outset of the transition period.
The owners' association must maintain both property and liability insurance on
all units and common elements, and such coverage must begin no later than "the
time of the first conveyance of a unit to a person other than a declarant."' 8 7 The
Act describes in detail the minimum amount and mandatory provisions of the
insurance.' 8 8 The primary importance of this provision is protection it affords
to both the developer's and the unit owners' interests at a time when control of
180. Id. § 47C-3-I03(d).
181. Id.
182. Id. § 47C-3-103(e).
183. Id. § 47C-3-105.
184. Id. This provision precludes enforcement of long-term contracts of a self-serving nature
entered into by the developer under the guise of the association.
185. Id.
186. Id. This right of termination may be exercised after 90 days notice. The General Statutes
Commission altered the Uniform Condominium Act by requiring the declarant to provide notice on
the face of contracts made with third parties regarding the association's right to cancel. Failure of
the declarant to do so does not affect the association's ability to cancel. Id. This notice requirement
was added by the General Statutes Commission out of "concern for persons who in good faith enter
into a contract with the executive board and expend capital towards fulfilling that contract." Id.
§ 47C-3-105 N.C. comment.
187. Id. §47C-3-115(a).
188. Id. §§ 47C-3-1 15(a) to (d). Most notably, the Act permits unit owners to have their own
insurance in addition to that provided by the association, and denies subrogation of any claim the
association may have against a unit owner to the association's insurer. For a general discussion of
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the common elements and the units themselves may not be clear.18 9
Further regulation of the transition period between total developer control
and unit owner control is the requirement that the developer pay all common
expenses until the unit owners' association makes an assessment. 190 This provi-
sion precludes any stoppage of vital services during a dispute between a devel-
oper and an owners' association. It does not, however, seem to preclude or deter
the dispute itself, because the Act contains no dispositive provision allocating
common expense liability during the transition phase. Instead, the Act precludes
the developer from using such a stoppage as leverage in forcing the owners'
association to assume liability. 19 1
The substantial statutory structure provided to the transition period from
total declarant control to total owner control is clear evidence of the general
assembly's intent to correct perceived inequities occurring in this area.
Although such provisions are clearly protective of unit owners, developers
should also welcome them, because they serve to establish bright lines of re-
quired performance and ultimately should serve to curtail potential litigation
arising from the transition period in condominium control. These provisions
have no counterpart in the Unit Ownership Act.
B. Tort and Contract Liability
Another area affected by the North Carolina Condominium Act is that of
potential liability of parties in the condominium relationship to each other and
to outsiders. Some aspects of this issue with respect to the unit owners' associa-
tion and outside liens are discussed below. 192 The Act addresses this subject in
section 3-111, which primarily separates and insulates the association from lia-
bilities of the developer. The Act expressly declares that "[n]either the associa-
tion nor any unit owner except the declarant is liable for that declarant's torts in
condominium-related insurance problems, see Rohan, Disruption of the Condominium Venture: The
Problems of Casualty Loss and Insurance, 64 COLuM. L. REV. 1045 (1964).
189. See Rohan, Perfecting the Condominium as a Housing Tool: Innovations in Tort Liability
and Insurance, 32 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 305 (1967).
190. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47C-3-I15(a) (Supp. 1986).
191. The Act does allocate certain special declarant rights to the developer-declarant, some of
which are exercisable during the transition period. These include the right to complete improve-
ments; the right to maintain sales offices, signs, and models; the right to use easements through the
common elements; and others. Id. § 47C-1-103(23). The Condominium Act deals with a second
aspect of relations between the association and the developer, future development rights. Future
development rights are one category of special declarant rights and relate to a developer's continuing
interest in the condominium. Specifically, these development rights are "rights reserved by a declar-
ant.., to add real estate... ; to create units, common elements, or limited common elements... ; to
subdivide units or convert units into common elements; or to withdraw real estate from a condomin-
ium." Id. § 47C-1-103(I 1). The Act permits the declarant to retain these development rights and to
exercise and alienate them.
Development rights retained by a declarant must be recorded in the declaration and must be
exercised within a specified time limit. Id. § 47C-2-105(8). When development rights are exercised,
the developer must file an amendment to the condominium declaration. Id. § 47C-2-1 10. The Act
contains several provisions to ensure that the exercise of these development rights is equitable with
respect to existing unit owners. Id. § 47C-2-1 10(e) to (d). These rights are also alienable, though
subject to some limitations depending on the nature of the conveyance. Id. § 47C-3-104.
192. See infra notes 252-73 and accompanying text.
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connection with any part of the condominium which that declarant has the re-
sponsibility to maintain."'193 Additionally, the declarant may be liable' 94 to the
association for wrongs, committed during the declarant's control of the condo-
minium, for which the association is sued.' 95 Such liability expressly includes
tort liability for losses suffered by the association not covered by insurance'
96
and losses actually caused by declarant's breach of contract. 197 The intent of
these sections is apparently to shield the association from liability for torts or
breaches of contract committed by the declarant. It is an absolute shield with
respect to liability arising from areas of the condominium that the declarant had
a duty to control. When the liability is an association liability, the shield is
merely a right of indemnification.
The Act further makes declarants liable for all litigation expenses of the
association if they are found liable on any other grounds, 198 and tolls any stat-
utes of limitation while the declarant is in control. 199 This tolling provision
gives the association an obvious advantage in pursuing claims against the declar-
ant both for contract and tort claims. The Unit Ownership Act did not contain
any similar provision. This aspect of the Condominium Act may alter a 1984
decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals.
In Colony Hill Condominium I Association v. Colony Co.200 a unit owners'
association sought to recover tort damages from the condominium developer for
negligent construction when an allegedly improperly installed fireplace and the
absence of firewalls between units combined to cause substantial damage to one
building in the complex. 20 1 The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's
grant of summary judgment for the developer, on the basis that a six-year statute
of repose20 2 barred plaintiff's action.20 3 The court of appeals rejected plaintiff's
argument that defendant's conveyance of a unit two years earlier tolled the stat-
ute until that date, reasoning that the conveyance in question occurred in a sepa-
rate building from the one in question.204 This arguably arbitrary test for the
tolling of statutes of limitation, 20 5 based on the happenstance of continued de-
veloper interest in the building wherein the potential liability occurred, is no
longer operative. The Condominium Act provides for tolling up to the date that
193. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47C-3-111(1) (Supp. 1986).
194. This liability is contingent on reasonable notice and an opportunity for the declarant to
defend. Id. § 47C-3-111(c).
195. Id.
196. Id. § 47C-3-11I(c)(1).
197. Id. § 47C-3-1 1 1(c)(2).
198. Id. § 47C-3-1II(d).
199. Id.
200. 70 N.C. App. 390, 320 S.E.2d 273 (1984).
201. Id. at 391-92, 320 S.E.2d at 274.
202. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-50(5) (1963).
203. Colony Co., 70 N.C. App. at 394-95, 320 S.E.2d at 276.
204. Id. at 395, 320 S.E.2d at 276-77.
205. It is not clear that a statute of repose would be tolled at all under the Condominium Act.
In Colony Co. the court explained the difference between statutes of repose and statutes of limitation,
noting that "[iun enacting the statute of repose.., the legislature defined a liability of limited dura-
tion. Once the time limit on the plaintiff's cause of action expired, the defendants were effectively
'cleared' of any wrongdoing or obligation." Id. at 394, 320 S.E.2d at 276.
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declarant control of the condominium association ends. 20 6 This is a better pro-
vision than that provided by the court in Colony Co., because notice of termina-
tion of the developer's control over the condominium is clear both to the unit
owners' association and the developer. The Act also permits a reasonable tolling
without any potential for extended tolling when a developer retains a long-term
interest in one or more units.
A second issue with respect to potential tort and contract liability exists,
but is addressed by the Act only in the context of insurance, the power of assess-
ment,20 7 and, by inference, the power to incorporate. 208 This second issue is the
potential liability of unit owners for liabilities of the unit owners' association. 20 9
This potential liability is substantial, and the Act addresses it in several ways.
The Act first requires that liability insurance be maintained on the condomin-
ium. 210 Second, the Act limits assessments to pay judgments against the associ-
ation to the units in the condominium at the time judgment was entered 21' and
requires apportionment consistent with the ratio of common expense liability. 212
A money judgment against the association may also be the source for a lien on
the units in the condominium at the time judgment is entered.213 These provi-
sions do provide some statutory limitation on the scope of unit owner liability,
but they also leave some questions unanswered.
In a typical case involving tort liability of property owners, the person and
not the property of the tortfeasor is the subject of the liability. As the statute is
written, the assessment liability and potential judgment lien apparently attach to
the unit. This is potentially troublesome when a sale is attempted of units sub-
ject to a potential or extant liability assessment. 214 A reasonably wary buyer or
a lawyer would likely find a pendent suit or docketed judgment lien, which
would make it difficult if not impossible to alienate units subject to them
(presuming that the liability remains with the unit and not with the unit owner).
Should the unit be sold, either through the purchaser's inadvertence or subject
to his knowledge of the liability, it is further unclear whether the purchaser is
obligated to pay the assessment. If the Act is interpreted literally,215 the liability
attaches to the unit, and the new owner must pay the assessment or face the
206. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47C-3-1 1 l(d) (Interim Supp. 1986). For a discussion of developer con-
trol see supra text accompanying notes 180-82.
207. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 47C-3-115 to 117 (Interim Supp. 1986).
208. Id. § 47C-3-102(a)(2), (10), (11).
209. Knight, Incorporation of Condominium Common Areas? An Alternative, 50 N.C.L. REV. I,
5 (1971).
210. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47C-3-113(a)(2) (Interim Supp. 1986).
211. Id. § 47C-3-115(d).
212. Id.; see Note, Condominium Unit Owner Tort Liability: Owens v. Dutcher, 35 BAYLOR L.
REV. 189 (1983) (discussing Texas common-law apportionment of unit owner liability for associa-
tion torts).
213. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47C-3-117(a) (Interim Supp. 1986).
214. This is particularly true because the North Carolina Condominium Act deleted some of the
notice requirements for resale of condominiums. See infra note 245.
215. The express wording of§ 47C-3-115(d), that liability assessments may be made "against the
units," and § 47C-3-117(a), that docketed money judgments against the association create a lien




possible imposition of a lien.216 This interpretation may seem harsh to an un-
knowing new owner and arguably may encourage sales of units in the face of
significant liability litigation.2 17 Conversely, to hold that the statute imposes
liability on the unit owners at the time of judgment may make execution of a
money judgment against an association a nightmare, because execution of the
judgment would involve keeping track of every association member who subse-
quently conveys her interest in the condominium.
On closer examination a further problem arises in this area. Mortgage liens
on the individual units, in most instances, will have priority over judgment
liens. The amount of a unit owner's equity in each unit will vary. It follows that
foreclosure of the judgment lien will exact varying payments from individual
unit owners to the extent that their equity is insufficient to pay their full propor-
tionate share of the judgment. This seems particularly inequitable given the unit
owner's likely nonnegligent status. It follows that the deep pocket of liens on
individual units may in fact be largely illusory in some instances, and may de-
pend on aggregate unit owner equity.
Another potential limitation on unit owner liability is the Condominium
Act's implicit authorization for the owners' association to incorporate. 2 18 Nor-
mally, incorporation permits shareholders of the corporation to enjoy limited
liability with respect to torts and breaches of contract by the corporation.2 19
Incorporation might insulate unit owners from association liability;2 20 however,
the agency relationship between the unit owners and the association, and the
owner's retained proprietary property interest, may preclude limited liability
through incorporation.22 1 The Condominium Act simply does not address this
matter.
Thus, the Condominium Act deals adequately with assessment and indem-
nification of liability between the developer, owners' association, and unit own-
ers at the time a judgment is entered against the association. The Act, however,
does not satisfactorily address the larger issues of potential liability when third
parties are involved or when unit owners attempt to utilize incorporation as a
means to limit liability. This inadequacy is likely to be moot in a majority of
cases given the Act's mandatory insurance provision, but remains a potential
area of uncertainty in the law of condominiums in North Carolina.
Despite its failure to resolve the aforementioned issues, the Condominium
Act is a significant improvement over the provisions of the Unit Ownership Act.
The Unit Ownership Act made the owners jointly and severally liable with the
216. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47C-3-117 (Interim Supp. 1986). This is not the case if the purchaser
obtained title pursuant to foreclosure of a first mortgage or deed of trust, in which case unpaid
assessments, which became due prior to acquisition of title by the purchaser, become common ex-
penses paid by all owners proportionately. Id. § 47C-3-116(f).
217. Purchasers who bought in such a situation could presumably avail themselves of normal
remedies for fraud or misrepresentation.
218. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47C-3-101 (Supp. 1986).
219. Id. § 55-53(e) (1982).
220. See Hyatt & Rhoads, Concepts of Liability in the Development and Administration of Condo-
minium and Home Owners Associations, 12 WAKE FORsT L. REV. 915, 947-48 (1976).
221. Id. at 947; Knight, supra note 209, at 7-8.
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owners' association for judgments entered against the association.22 2 The only
protection for a unit owner was a provision requiring the judgment creditor to
exhaust the assets of the association before pursuing the unit owner.22 3 The lack
of any apportionment scheme or limitation as to what assets of the unit owner
could be reached threatened truly draconian liability for nonnegligent unit own-
ers under the Unit Ownership Act.
C. Consumer Protections
The most important aspect of the North Carolina Condominium Act is its
substantial protection of the consumer, both as a potential buyer and as an
owner.224 These protections were incorporated into Article 4 of the Condomin-
ium Act to preclude promoter abuses that the Unit Ownership Act did not ad-
dress.225 The protections included in Article 4 are significantly greater than any
provided by the common law. These provisions focus on required notice to the
prospective purchaser, rescindability of sales contracts, and incorporation of the
North Carolina common law dealing with express and implied warranties. These
protections in most instances are mandatory, but may be waived by the purchas-
ers if the condominium is exclusively nonresidential. 226 Article 4 makes itself
enforceable by creating a statutory claim for relief for failure to comply with its
provisions, and authorizes the court to award attorney's fees to the prevailing
party.2
27
The initial protection of consumers in the North Carolina Condominium
Act takes the form of restrictions and prescriptions relating to offering228 units
for sale to the public. 229 Article 4 requires a declarant to prepare a public offer-
ing statement "prior to the offering of any interest in a unit to the public."123 0
This statement must contain information consisting of a general description of
222. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47A-23 (1984).
223. Id. § 47A-26. For a discussion of insurance provisions and potential unit owner liability,
see Schreiber, The Lateral Housing Development: Condominium and or Home Owners Association?,
117 U. PA. L. REV. 1104, 1138-45 (1969).
224. Article 4 of the North Carolina Condominium Act is entitled "Protection of Purchasers."
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47C-4 (Interim Supp. 1986).
225. Id. ch. 47C N.C. comment; see also Note, Consumer Protection in Oklahoma Condominiun
Sales, 19 TULSA L.J. 100 (1983) (discussing the need for revision of Oklahoma's first generation
condominium statute to provide for consumer protection).
226. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47C-4-101(a) (Interim Supp. 1986). If the disposition of a condomin-
ium is gratuitous, court-ordered, subject to cancellation, or made to a realtor, an offering statement
is not required. Id. § 47C-4-101(b).
227. Id. § 47C-4-1 17. The General Statutes Commission deleted a Uniform Condominium Act
provision allowing for punitive damages for willful noncompliance with the Act, relying instead on
general North Carolina law with respect to punitive damages. Id. § 47C-4-117 N.C. comment.
228. The Act defines "offering" as "any advertisement, inducement, solicitation, or attempt to
encourage any person to acquire any interest in a unit, other than as security for an obligation." Id.
§ 47C-4-117. The Act provides that an advertisement in a newspaper, magazine, or other broadcast
media for a condominium in another state does not constitute an offering if the advertisement de-
clares that an "offering may be made only in compliance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the
condominium is located." Id.
229. Id. § 47C-4-102.
230. Id. The Condominium Act varies from the Uniform Condominium Act in this provision by
making the declarant or realtor who delivers an offering statement liable for mistakes therein, re-
gardless of who prepared the statement. Id. § 47C-4-102(a) N.C. comment.
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the condominium;23 1 copies of the declaration, bylaws, and any supplemental
contracts that the buyer may sign at closing;232 any warranties provided by the
declarant;233 and any hidden association costs, 2 3 4 as well as substantial informa-
tion on the projected potential association expenses; 2 35 and title status of the
condominium. 236
This offering statement must be delivered to prospective purchasers prior to
the execution of a purchase contract.237 No conveyance pursuant to the
purchase contract may be made for seven calendar days following its execution,
during which time the purchaser is given the absolute right to rescind, without
penalty, and receive a prompt refund of all payments.2 38 As an added protec-
tion, any payments received by a declarant pursuant to a purchase contract and
subject to the offering statement and right of rescission must be placed in escrow
in a North Carolina bank.239 These funds are expressly deemed to be the prop-
erty of the purchaser during the rescission period.240 It is mandatory that the
public offering statement include express notice of the offering statement re-
quirement, right of rescission, and escrow deposit requirement. 24 1 Finally, the
promoter is required to label all plats, plans, and promotional materials to show
clearly what units will not necessarily be built242 and may label what units must
be built, 24 3 with the concurrent obligation to complete anything labelled as
mandatory.2 44 Thus, it appears the general assembly intended not only to pro-
vide substantive protections for purchasers, starting at the inception of the
purchase and continuing through consummation, but also to ensure that pro-
spective purchasers have notice of their legal rights under the Act.245
The Condominium Act similarly provides for consumer protections after
purchase of the condominium is completed. These protections are the ex-
press246 and implied247 warranties concerning residences that exist at common
231. Id. § 47C-4-103(a)(2).
232. Id. § 47C-4-103(a)(4).
233. Id. § 47C-4-103(a)(9).
234. Id. § 47C-4-103(a)(6).
235. Id. § 47C-4-103(a)(5).
236. Id. § 47C-4-103(a)(8), (11).
237. Id. § 47C-4-108(a). The Uniform Condominium Act does not require delivery of the offer-
ing statement prior to the time a purchase agreement is made; however, the Uniform Act does allow
a 15-day rescission period. UNIF. CONDOMINIuM AcT, supra note 32, 4-108, at 546-47.
238. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47C-4-108(a) (Supp. 1986).
239. Id. § 47C-4-110(a).
240. Id.
241. Id. §§ 47C-4-103(a)(10), (12).
242. Id. §47C-4-118.
243. Id. § 47C-4-119. Notice of this is provided to prospective purchasers by the mandatory
disclosure of financing accomplished with respect to improvements labelled "must be built." Id.
§ 47C4-103(a)(16).
244. Id. § 47C-4-119.
245. The regulation of resales of condominiums is much less stringent and requires merely pro-
viding common expense assessment and other fee information. Id. § 47C-4-109. The North Caro-
lina Comment to § 47C-4-109 explains that "[tfhe Commission was of the opinion that a resale
occurs in an arm's length bargaining setting and the requirements placed upon the seller in such a
situation seem unjustified by the current experience in North Carolina." Id. N.C. comment.
246. Id. § 47C-4-113.
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law in North Carolina. The sections of the North Carolina Condominium Act
that involve express and implied warranties represent a substantial departure
from the provisions of the Uniform Condominium Act.2 48 These sections were
rewritten by the General Statutes Commission on its judgment that both the
express and implied warranty law in North Carolina "applicable to single family
residential dwellings should also be applicable to condominiums. '249 The ra-
tionale for this departure was that the "law of North Carolina (based upon a
theory of negligence as opposed to contract) provides as much protection to a
purchaser as the... warranty provisions of the Uniform Act .... ,,250 It is
beyond the scope of this Note to examine the North Carolina common law on
this subject. It should be noted, however, that the law in this area is evolving,25t
and had the warranty provisions of the Uniform Act been adopted, a bifurcation
in the North Carolina law of real property warranties would have resulted.
In sum, the Condominium Act places significant duties on developers and
promoters to take positive steps to ensure the substantive fairness of actions in-
volving consumers. Whether these provisions will be effective depends largely
on consumers. Should they fail to read or understand the information provided
by the Act, their position will be no better than before the Condominium Act
was passed, because they cannot exercise rights of which they are unaware. It is
difficult to imagine, though, how the North Carolina Condominium Act could
have gone farther in leading the horse to water.
D. Liens
As previously mentioned, the unit owners' association may, when neces-
sary, avail itself of a statutory lien process incorporated into section 3-116 of the
North Carolina Condominium Act. This lien is available for failure to pay as-
sessments and/or fines levied by the association.25 2 These assessment liens in
favor of the association are foreclosable as if they were mortgage liens,25 3 and
247. Id. § 47C-4-114.
248. UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACr, supra note 32, § 4-113, at 556-59.
249. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 47C-4-113, -114 N.C. comment (Supp. 1986).
250. Id. 47C-4-113 N.C. comment; see Pearlstein, Developer Liability for Defects in Condomin-
urns, 74 ILL. B.J. 18 (1985) (discussing various theories of recovery for condominium purchasers
against developers for faulty construction or defects). It is also interesting to note that condominium
owners may maintain actions against negligent architects and contractors based on a third party
beneficiary theory. See Quail Hollow East Condominium Ass'n v. Donald J. Scholz Co., 47 N.C.
App. 518, 525-26, 268 S.E.2d 12, 17, disc. rev. denied, 301 N.C. 527, 273 S.E.2d 454 (1980).
The Act does permit a waiver of implied warranties for strictly nonresidential condominiums.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47C-4-101(b) (Supp. 1986). A waiver for a specified defect may be effective if
such waiver was part of the bargain. Id. § 47C-4-115(a); see also Comment, Caveat Venditor in
Maryland Condominium Sales: Cases and Legislation Imposing Implied Warranties in Sales of Resi-
dential Condominiums, 14 U. BALT. L. REV. 116, 129 (1984) (discussing the Maryland law of im-
plied warranties).
251. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47C-4-114 N.C. comment (Supp. 1986); see Oates v. JAG, Inc., 314
N.C. 276, 281, 333 S.E.2d 222, 226 (1985); Note, Oates v. JAG: Let the Builder Beware-A Rem-
edy for Subsequent Purchasers of Homes in North Carolina, 64 N.C.L. REV. 1485, 1488-89 (1986).
252. The lien becomes effective "when filed of record in the office of the clerk of superior court of
the county in which the unit is located in the manner provided therefor by Article 8 of Chapter 44 of




have statutory priority over all other liens and encumbrances except those im-
posed by the government and those recorded prior to docketing the assessment
lien.2 54 The life of an unexecuted assessment lien is limited to three years if no
action is taken in the interim to enforce it.255 The assessment lien is not, how-
ever, an exclusive remedy for monies owed the association, and other legal ac-
tion is sanctioned by the Act to recover sums for which the lien is imposed.256
To effectuate this section the Act mandates that any judgment in a subsequent
action must award attorney's fees to the prevailing party.2 57 This scheme is
substantially the same as that provided by the Unit Ownership Act.258
A second section of the Condominium Act addresses the issue of outside
liens affecting the condominium.2 5 9 This section, which has no counterpart in
the Unit Ownership Act, divides lienholders into judgment lienholders and those
possessing valid security interests granted by the association in connection with
section 3-112 of the Act.260 Judgment liens may not be liens on the common
elements of the condominium, but when docketed become liens against all units
of the condominium as of the date of entry of judgment.26 1 Lienholders who
possess secured interests conveyed by the association, as permitted by the
Act,2 62 must execute liens on common elements, if any, before attempting to
levy on any unit of the condominium.2 63
Regardless of category, and excepting mortgages and deeds of trust, owners
of units encumbered by a lien may pay their proportion of the lien and obtain a
release as to their own property. Such apportionment is computed by using each
affected unit's ratio of total common expense liability.264 Thus, individual unit
owners may remove their units from encumbering liens by paying their share
based on their proportion of common expense liability. 265 Upon payment the
association has no ability to assess that unit further with respect to the same
254. Id. § 47C-3-I16(b). These prior docketed liens expressly include mortgages and deeds of
trust. Id. Assessment liens must be docketed to be effective. Id. This is a variation from the Uni-
form Condominium Act, as is the priority given to purchase money mortgages. The former varia-
tion was as to be consistent with North Carolina law and the latter variation was made to comply
with the requirements of federal mortgage agencies. Id. § 47C-3-116 N.C. comment, UNIF. CONDO-
MINIUM AcT, supra note 32, § 3-116 at 527-30.
255. Id. § 47C-3-116(c).
256. Id. § 47C-3-116(d).
257. Id. § 47C-3-116(e). This was an addition to the Uniform Condominium Act made to en-
hance the association's ability to enforce the lien. Id. § 47C-3-116 N.C. comment.
258. The General Statutes Commission varied from the provisions of the Uniform Act by "re-
quiring that liens of the owners' association must be recorded to be perfected and by preserving the
priority of purchase money mortgages in order to comply with requirements established by federal
mortgage agencies." Id.; see Stewart, Florida Condominium Law: Super Priority for Assessment
Liens?, FLA. B.J., Oct. 1985, at 92-96 (discussing pending Florida legislation aimed at giving assess-
ment liens a super priority over mortgage liens).
259. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47C-3-117 (Supp. 1986).
260. Id. § 47C-3-I17(a), (b).
261. Id. § 47C-3-117(a). This lien is the sole lien available to unsecured creditors, because the
statute expressly states that "[n]o other property of a unit owner is subject to the claims of creditors
of the association." Id.
262. Id. § 47C-3-112.
263. Id. § 47C-3-117(b).
264. Id. § 47C-3-I17(c).
265. Id.
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lien.266
This section of the Act is expressly made applicable to laborer's and materi-
alman's liens arising from work performed prior to declaration of the condomin-
ium 2 67 and thus appears to modify the common law rule in North Carolina. In
W.H. Dail Plumbing v. Roger Baker & Associates26 8 the North Carolina Court
of Appeals required that a materialman's lien against a condominium, which
arose out of work completed prior to the filing of the declaration,2 69 must be
apportioned "based upon the materials and labor furnished to that unit, and its
proportionate part of labor and materials furnished the common area .... "T270
Thus, in Dail Plumbing the court required apportionment of the lien, but its
apportionment formula was based on work performed. The Condominium Act
now requires, at least with respect to voluntary unit owner payment,27 ' that
such apportionment be based on common expense liability.272 This appears to
be a more equitable result insofar as it protects the interests of the lienholder
while apportioning liability in accordance with a more predictable scheme, when
in all likelihood the unit owner had no say in the original contract.
273
V. CONCLUSION
The passage of the North Carolina Condominium Act in the absence of
substantial litigation pressure is an indication of a general assembly desirous of
exerting control over the condominium relationship. This indication is borne
out by the terms of the North Carolina Condominium Act, both with respect to
its scope and structure and its substantive regulations. Like most statutes, the
Act falls short of complete clarity, and is at times ambiguous and incomplete.
The primary issues so affected are those concerning the nature of the relation
between unit owner and owners' association, and the methods for resolving
claims and liabilities of one to the other. In contrast to its predecessor, however,
the North Carolina Condominium Act is a quantum improvement in the regula-
tion of the purchase, sale, and ownership of condominiums. Its enactment
places North Carolina at the forefront of states recognizing the inadequacies of
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. 64 N.C. App. 682, 308 S.E.2d 452 (1983), disc. rev. denied, 310 N.C. 152, 311 S.E.2d 296
(1984).
269. A plumbing subcontractor brought suit against a developer and one unit owner after the
condominium developer defaulted on payments due the subcontractor. id. at 683, 308 S.E.2d at
452-53.
270. Id. at 685-86, 308 S.E.2d at 454.
271. It is not clear from the statute whether enforcement of a materialman's lien would also
require apportionment based on common expense liability. Thus, Dail Plumbing is arguably still
good law in North Carolina.
272. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47C-3-117(c) (Supp. 1986).
273. Because the apportionment percentage only expressly applies to liens arising from work
done before the condominium is declared, all nondeclarant owners would have no knowledge of or
control over the contract that is the basis of the lien.
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first generation condominium statutes and correcting those inadequacies
through positive legislation.
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